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EARTH MOVEMENT CLAIMS UNDER ALL RISK
INSURANCE: THE RULES HAVE CHANGED IN
CALIFORNIA
Brian Mattis*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under most "all risk" building insurance policies written
in California prior to 1983, losses caused by a combination
of earth movement' and defective design or improper con-
struction would have been covered. This result arose from
the application of well settled principles of insurance law
which had been applied in other states and accepted by Cali-
fornia courts.! Those principles provide that when a loss is
caused by a combination of an insured cause and an unin-
sured (or excluded) cause, the loss is covered under the poli-
cy.3 Commentators have labeled the basic problem as one of
"concurrent causation,"" and it is said to have caused havoc
in the handling of insurance claims.'
Problems of concurrent causation can arise with regard
to almost any form of insurance, whether first party or third
party coverage. 6 The problem has been particularly trouble-
© 1990 by Brian Mattis.
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1. As used herein, the term "earth movement" includes any form of earth
movement, natural or otherwise, including earthquake.
2. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
4. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Polity Drafting. New Perils for
Property Insurers, 20 THE FORUM 385 (1985) [hereinafter Bragg]; Brewer, Concurrent
Causation in Insurance Contracts, 59 MICH. L. REv. 1141 (1961) [hereinafter Brew-
er]; Houser & Kent, Concurrent Causation in First-Party Insurance Claims: Consumers
Cannot Afford Concurrent Causation, 21 TORT & INS. L. J. 573 (1986)[hereinafter
Houser & Kent].
5. Bragg, supra note 4, at 385, 388-91.
6. First party insurance usually covers risks to the insured's own person or
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some for the insurance industry in California with regard to
claims involving earth movement exclusions on all risk insur-
ance policies providing first party coverage on buildings.
As a result of language changes in many policy forms
since 1983,' the passage of Section 10088 of the California
Insurance Code,' and the California Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Garvey v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company,' the
scope of coverage for loss caused by earth movement under
most "all risk" insurance policies in California has been sig-
nificantly reduced. However, before concluding that an earth
movement claim is not covered under a building insurance
policy, several factors should be carefully considered.
First, it is apparent that some companies did not give
adequate notice to their customers when they reduced the
scope of coverage under their new policies. Therefore, under
well settled principles of insurance law, those customers
should be allowed to rely on the old policy forms to deter-
mine the scope of coverage available."0
Second, Section 10088 of the Insurance Code only ap-
plies to earthquake losses and has no application to other
types of earth movement claims. Moreover, it is possible that
the statute is unconstitutional if it is applied to claims made
under coverage that went into effect prior to the passage of
the policy. This would include claims made under the princi-
ple discussed in the preceding paragraph.
Third, even under the restricted parameters of the
property. Third party coverage, such as automobile liability insurance, usually
covers the insured's potential liability for harm done to the person or property of
another.
7. Gordon & Crowley, Earth Movement and Water Damage Exposure: A Land-
slide in Coverage, 50 INS. COUNS. J. 418 (1983) [hereinafter Gordon & Crowley];
Bragg, supra note 4, at 385.
8. CAL. INS. CODE § 10088 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 530, 532, or any other pro-
vision of law, and in the absence of an endorsement or an additional
policy provision specifically covering the peril of earthquake, no policy
which by its terms does not cover the peril of earthquake shall pro-
vide or shall be held to provide coverage for any loss or damage
when earthquake is a proximate cause regardless of whether the loss
or damage also directly or indirectly results from or is contributed to,
concurrently or in any sequence by any other proximate or remote
cause, whether or not covered by the policy . ...
9. 48 Cal. 3d 395, 770 P.2d 704, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1989).
10. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
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Garvey opinion, when a loss is caused by a combination of an
excluded form of earth movement plus an insured peril, the
burden is still on the insurance company to prove that the
excluded cause was the "efficient proximate cause" of the
loss. t This might be a difficult burden for the insurer to
overcome before a properly educated finder of fact. More-
over, the Garvey opinion is so illogical that it may not be
able to withstand an attack on its basic reasoning. 2
Before discussing these issues some basic principles of
insurance law will be examined. In addition, the history of
first party insurance coverage for building structures will be
reviewed. Many of the problems associated with earth move-
ment losses have been the result of poor policy draftsman-
ship coupled with a failure of the insurance industry to pay
attention to long-standing fundamental rules of policy inter-
pretation. Moreover, the problem is likely to have been exac-
erbated by the failure of many companies in the insurance
industry to properly inform their customers of the reduced
scope of coverage that was inherent in the new policy forms
that were introduced beginning in 1983.
II. CONCURRENT CAUSATION AND ALL RISK
INSURANCE COVERAGE
Under most "all risk" insurance policies written before
1983, any loss that was not specifically and expressly exclud-
ed was covered under the policy."s Thus, if the policy in-
11. The burden is on the insured initially to prove that the event is within
the scope of the basic coverage. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 181 Cal. App.
3d 537, 226 Cal. Rptr. 435, 437 (1986). When the policy insures against "all risks
of physical damage", this is done by simply showing that the property suffered
physical damage. It is not necessary to show the cause of the damage. The bur-
den then shifts to the insurer to prove that the loss was caused by a peril that
was specifically excluded from the coverage of the policy. Strubble v. United
Services Automobile Ass'n., 35 Cal. App. 3d 498, 504, 110 Cal. Rptr. 828, 831-32
(1973). In Garve, the California Supreme Court cited these two opinions in
support of its dicta regarding the burden of proof. 48 Cal. 3d 395, 406, 770 P.2d
704, 710, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292, 298 (1989).
12. See infra note 51
13. Many in the insurance industry would quarrel with this statement and
some commentators have insisted that even under all risk policies there are
certain implied exceptions. See, e.g., Cozen & Bennett, Forluity: The Unnamed
Exclusion, 20 THE FORUM 222 (1985); Gorman, All Risks of Loss v. AU Loss: An
Examination of Broad Form Insurance Coverage, 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 346 (1959).
However, few cases support the contention that there are implied exclusions, and
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sured property against all risks of physical damage and the
insured could show that the property suffered physical dam-
age, the loss was covered. If the insurer could prove that the
sole cause of the loss was excluded under the policy, the loss
would not be covered. However, if the loss was proximately
caused by a combination of an excluded cause and a cause
that was not excluded, the loss was covered. This is because
of the widely accepted rule that when a policy of insurance
expressly insures against direct loss or damage by one ele-
ment, but excludes loss or damage caused by another ele-
ment, the coverage extends to the loss even though the ex-
cluded element is a contributory cause. This basic rule has
been expressed in several different forms, but it was accept-
ed by courts in California 4 and in many other jurisdic-
tions. 5
Since most "all risk" building policies written prior to
1983 did not exclude loss caused by defective design or im-
proper construction, it follows that a loss caused by a combi-
nation of earth movement and defective design, 16 or earth
the proposition contradicts the basic rule that insurance policies are to be con-
strued strictly against the insurance company. In any event, for purposes of the
present discussion the so called "unnamed exclusions" will have no bearing.
14. Prior to the case of Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 48 Cal. 3d
395, 770 P.2d 704, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1989), the California courts did not con-
fine the rule to first party property insurance claims, and treated the rule as
being general. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d
123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973); Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27
Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963); Zimmerman v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 99 Cal. App. 723,
279 P. 464 (1929). See also Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir.
1982) (applying California law).
15. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hanley, 252 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1958); Essex
House v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 404 F. Stipp. 978, 985 (S.D. Ohio
1975); General American Transp. Corp. v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 239 F. Supp. 844
(E.D. Tenn. 1965), aflfd per curium, 369 F.2d 906 (6th Cir. 1966); Mattis v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 118 Ill. App. 3d 612, 454 N.E.2d 1156 (1983); Vormelker
v. Oleksinski, 40 Mich. App. 618, 199 N.W.2d 287 (1972); Avis v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 283 N.C. 142, 195 S.E.2d 545 (1973); Kraemer Bros., v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 555, 278 N.W.2d 857 (1979); Lawyer v. Boling, 71 Wis.
2d 408, 238 N.W.2d 514 (1976).
16. Cf Essex House v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 978
(S.D. Ohio 1975); Plaza Equities Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 372 F. Supp.
1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); General American Transp. Corp. v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,
239 F. Supp. 844 (E.D. Tenn. 1965), afld per curium, 369 F.2d 906 (6th Cir.
1966); Mattis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 118 I1. App. 3d 612, 73 Ill. Dec.
907, 454 N.E.2d 1156 (1983). These cases did not involve earthquake damage, but
each involved defective design combined with an excluded peril, and in each case
the losses were held to be covered under the policy.
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movement and improper construction, 7 would be covered
under the policy.
A. History of Concurrent Causation
The problem of concurrent causation is not new to the
insurance industry. Phillips' 1840 treatise on insurance law
discusses concurrent causation in connection with marine in-
surance.1
8
Prior to World War II, problems of concurrent causation
seldom arose with regard to insurance on buildings because
the types of coverage available were very narrow. Insurance
on buildings in the early days of the industry was confined
to the perils of fire and lightning.'9 Extended Coverage En-
dorsements were subsequently added to the fire coverage.
For an additional premium charge above the cost of the fire
insurance, these endorsements provided coverage against the
perils of windstorm, hail, explosion, riot, aircraft, vehicles
and smoke. For a small additional premium, coverage against
vandalism and malicious mischief could be added.
Eventually insurance coverage for buildings was broad-
ened still further with the addition of a long list of specifical-
ly named perils. ° These "named perils" policies did not
contain many exclusions from coverage for the simple reason
that there was no coverage for any peril that was not ex-
pressly named. When a loss occurred under this type of
17. Cf. Essex House v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 978
(S.D. Ohio 1975) (negligent workmanship); Vormelker v. Oleksinski, 40 Mich. App.
618, 199 N.W.2d 287 (1972) (improper construction, taking into consideration the
type of soil, the geography of the area, etc.). These cases held that there was cov-
erage when improper construction combined with an excluded cause to cause a
loss.
18. W. PHILLIPS, LAW OF INSURANCE, 13, 16 (2d ed. 1840).
19. Hedges, Improving Properry and Casualty Insurance Coverage, 15 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 353, 374, nn.31-33 (1950) [hereinafter Hedges].
20. The typical "broad form" dwelling policy would insure against loss caused
by: fire or lightning; windstorm or hail; explosion; riot or civil commotion; air-
craft; vehicles; smoke; vandalism or malicious mischief; theft; falling objects; weight
of ice, snow or sleet; collapse of a building or any part of a building; sudden and
accidental discharge or overflow of water or steam from within a plumbing,
heating or air conditioning system or from within a household appliance; sudden
and accidental tearing asunder, cracking burning or bulging of a steam or hot
water heating system, air conditioning system, or an appliance for heating water;
freezing of a plumbing, heating or air conditioning system; sudden and accidental
damage from artificially generated electrical current; breakage of glass.
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building insurance, the burden was on the insured to prove
that the loss was caused by one of the named perils. With
the exception of losses caused by a combination of earth-
quake and fire,2 ' or war risk and fire,22 problems of con-
current causation seldom arose with regard to insurance on
buildings, although they did arise with regard to other first
party insurance coverage.23
During the 1940's and 1950's many insurance companies
began to write insurance on buildings that provided for cov-
erage against all risks of physical damage to the structure.
Under these policies, if the insured could show that the
property had suffered physical damage, the loss was covered
unless the insurer could prove that the loss was caused by a
specifically excluded peril.25 In effect, the burden of proof
21. In most states, fire insurance policies did not exclude losses caused by
earthquake. See E. PATTERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE
765-68 (2d ed. 1947). However, cases arising out of the great San Francisco earth-
quake of 1906 show that fire insurance policies issued in California excluded loss
"occasioned by" earthquake. This clause was given effect only in cases where it
was found that earthquake was the immediate, direct, and proximate cause of the
fire which damaged the insured property. If a fire started in a distant building
and communicated from building to building until it reached the insured proper-
ty, it was held that the fire was caused indirectly by an earthquake, and not
directly; and therefore, the loss would be covered. Baker & Hamilton v.
Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co., 157 F. 280 (N.D. Cal. 1907). See also
Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co. v. Willard, 164 F. 404 (9th Cir. 1908). But see
Henry Hilp Tailoring Co. v. Williamsburch City Fire Ins. Co., 157 F. 285 (N.D.
Cal. 1907) (loss not covered).
22. It was common for policies to insure buildings against the peril of fire,
but with an exclusion for any loss or damage by fire which took place by means
of invasion, insurrection, riot, or civil commotion, or of any military or usurped
power. See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Boon, 95 U.S. 117 (1877).
23. The problem did arise in connection with other forms of first party in-
surance coverage. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 99 Cal. App.
723, 726, 279 P. 464, 467 (1929), where the court held "when two causes join in
causing an injury, one of which is insured against, the insured is covered by the
policy .... "
24. Hedges, supra note 19, at 374, nn. 31-33.
25. Because the named peril-all risk of physical damage-was so broad, it be-
came necessary to exclude or except from coverage a very long list of perils. Typi-
cal exclusions under an all risk policy covering a building will be loss caused by:
earth movement; water damage; neglect; war; nuclear hazard; enforcement of ordi-
nance or law; wear and tear; marring; deterioration; inherent vice; latent defect;
mechanical breakdown; rust; mold; wet or dry rot; contamination; smog; smoke
from agricultural smudging or industrial operations; settling cracking, shrinking,
bulging, or expansion of pavements, patios foundations, walls, floors, roofs or ceil-
ings; birds; vermin; rodents; insects or domestic animals. The list of exclusions or
exceptions under the typical all risk personal property floater policy was much
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was shifted to the insurer to show the cause of the loss."6
Applying ordinary principles of insurance to these new poli-
cies meant that if a risk or peril was not specifically excepted
or excluded, a loss from such risk or peril was covered un-
der the policy even if it was very unusual."
If a loss was caused by a combination of two perils, one
covered and one excluded, the old problem of concurrent
causation arose. Insurers should have expected that in such
situations a court would naturally apply the rule that says
that if the policy is ambiguous, it will be construed against
the insurer because the insurer drafted the policy. Insurers
could avoid ambiguity by careful drafting.
Application of the doctrine of concurrent causation to
the modern all risk policy on building structures is simply
the result of applying old principles of insurance to new
forms of policies. Commentators working for the insurance
industry believe the doctrine of concurrent causation consti-
tutes a conspiracy by the courts against the industry. This
simply is not true.
With regard to earthquake and other forms of earth
movement, insurers attempted to avoid having to pay for
losses involving concurrent causation by drafting policies that
denied coverage when a loss was "caused by, resulting from,
contributed to or aggravated by any earth movement, includ-
ing but not limited to earthquake, volcanic eruption, land-
slide, mudflow, earth sinking, rising or shifting."2"
The problem was that all of the named causes of "earth
movement" were natural rather than man-made. Therefore,
shorier.
26. Under the older named perils policy the burden would be on the insured
to show what caused the loss because he was required to show that the loss was
caused by one of the named perils. Under the new all risk policies, once the in-
sured proved that the property had suffered physical damage, he had brought
himself within the scope of coverage. If the insurer wished to escape liability, it
would have to show that the loss was caused by something that was excepted or
excluded from coverage under the policy.
27. When I owned an insurance agency, I once had a customer submit a
claim under an all risk policy when a wild duck somehow got down his chimney
while he was on vacation. The duck did considerable damage, but since the policy
insured against all risks, and there was no exclusion for wild ducks, the loss was
covered under the policy.
28. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. Homeowners Policy Special Form 3, p. 5,
Form # FP-3953 (ed. 1/73).
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the courts applied the familiar rule of ejusdem generis 29 to
the phrase "any earth movement" and held that because all
of the specifically named forms of earth movement were
natural, the general phrase also applied only to natural forms
of earth movement. This meant that losses caused by man-
made or man caused forms of earth movement were covered
under the policy simply because they were risks of physical
damage, and they were not specifically excepted or excluded
under the policy terms.3
0
B. Modern All Risk Insurance Policies
During the 1970's several states passed legislation which
attempted to assure that insurance policies would be written
in simple and understandable language.3' In response, many
insurance companies began to issue "easy to read" policies
even in states where such policies were not required. 32 The
policy language for the earth movement exclusion was
changed so that the policy excluded losses "resulting directly
or indirectly from: earth movement."33 The obvious hope
was that this would exclude from coverage all loss caused by
29. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (5th ed. 1979).
30. Peach State Uniform Service, Inc. v. American Ins. Co., 507 F.2d 996 (5th
Cir. 1975); Gullett v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir.
1971); Wyatt v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 781 (D. Minn. 1969);
Mattis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 118 Ill. App. 3d 612, 454 N.E.2d 1156
(1983); Broome v. Allstate Ins. Co., 144 Ga. App. 318, 241 S.E.2d 34 (1977);
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. DeJames, 256 Md. 717, 261 A.2d 747 (1970);
Wisconsin Builders, Inc. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 65 Wis. 2d 91, 221
N.W.2d 832 (1974). Contra Stewart v. Preferred Fire Ins. Co., 206 Kan. 247, 477
P.2d 966 (1970).
31. 1 G. COUCH, COUCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 1:16 (2d ed.
1984).
32. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company sent its customers new policy
forms which included the following notice:
Overview of changes: Here is your new, improved, State Farm
Homeowners form which replaces your current form and endorse-
ments. The most noticeable improvement in the new form is the
wording. We've made it easier for you to read and understand. And
following are a few of the coverge changes provided by your new
form ....
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. Form # FP-7103 R/ILLO. The only change in the
coverage applicable to buildings was an announcement that coverage relating to
damage by vehicles had been expanded. There was no indication that any cover-
age on the building had been reduced.
33. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. Homeowners Policy Special Form 3, p. 7,
Form FP-7103.
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any type of earth movement, whether natural or man
made. 4
Alas, it was not to be. The change in the policy form
avoided the rule of ejusdem generis, but lack of care in draft-
ing gave the insurers a new problem. The new policy form
did not contain the words "contributed to or aggravated by"
earth movement, nor did it specifically exclude loss "caused
by" or "contributed to" by defective design or inadequate
construction. This meant that if a loss was caused by a com-
bination of earth movement and defective design, or a com-
bination of earth movement and inadequate construction,
there was an ambiguity in the policy coverage that would be
construed against the insurer. Thus, if both earth movement
and defective design were causes in fact, the loss was covered
under the policy. 5
When dealing with problems of concurrent causation,
most courts did not require the fact finder to determine
which of the two causes of the loss was the single efficient
proximate cause, provided that both were causes in fact."6
Moreover, most of the courts that applied the doctrine of
concurrent causation applied it with regard to first party
insurance coverage as well as third party coverage. 7
It is virtually certain that the insurers did not intend to
cover losses caused by a combination of earth movement and
defective design or construction. However, under established
principles of contract law, the undisclosed subjective inten-
tion of the insurer cannot control the meaning of the con-
tract.38 Only that intent which is expressed in the policy
may be applied.
Beginning in 1983, many companies began to modify
34. However, by failing to indicate that the effective coverage had been re-
duced, the industry left itself open to the claim that the new earth movement ex-
clusion was meant to be of the same scope as the old exclusion. It applied only
to natural forms of earth movement.
35. Under earlier policies the earth movement exclusion was read very nar-
rowly. See, e.g., Mattis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 118 I1. App. 3d 612, 617,
454 N.E.2d 1156, 1160 (1983). However, often cases suggest that this would be
the rule in those jurisdictions if a loss was caused by a combination of earth
movement and defective design. See cases cited supra notes 15 and 16.
36. See cases cited supra note 15 and 16.
37. See cases cited supra note 14. See also R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, INSURANCE
LAW § 5.5(d) (1988).
38. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6 (1982).
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their policies so that a loss caused by a combination of earth
movement and defective design would no longer be cov-
ered."9 This was usually done without granting any reduc-
tion in premium and, more importantly, without giving the
insured adequate notice that a reduction in coverage had oc-
curred.40 In many cases the insurer's failure to give ade-
quate notice meant that customers were unaware of the re-
duction in coverage. Thus, the uninformed consumer would
rarely switch to a company that had not decreased the scope
of coverage.
In the case of one leading company, the reduction in
the scope of coverage was accomplished by making three
basic changes in the policy form.42 First, the basic insurance
clause was changed so that instead of insuring the building
against "all risks of physical loss to the property," the policy
insured against "accidental direct physical loss to the proper-
ty."43
Second, the "earth movement" exclusion was modified to
read as follows:
We do not insure for loss which would not have oc-
curred in the absence of one or more of the following
excluded events. We do not insure for such loss regard-
less of: a) the cause of the excluded event; or b) other
causes of the loss; or c) whether other causes acted con-
currently or in any sequence with the excluded event to
produce the loss.
a. Ordinance or Law, meaning enforcement of ordinance
or law regulating the construction, repair or demolition
of a building or other structure, unless specifically pro-
vided under this policy.
39. Gordon and Crowley, supra note 7, at 426-27; Bragg, supra note 4, at
391-96.
40. This was my own experience in Illinois, as well as that of several of my
acquaintances who showed me their new homeowners policies at the time.
41. Although many companies were changing their policies to broaden the
scope of exclusions, apparently other companies remained with the old policy
forms, fearing that a change might be interpreted as an admission of coverage
under the older policy form. Gordon and Crowley, supra note 7, at 427. Thus a
well informed customer could have been expected to change companies if that
customer had been adequately informed of the decrease in policy coverage.
42. Bragg, supra note 4, at 392-94.
43. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. Homeowners Policy Special Form 3, p. 5,
Form # FP-7103 and State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. Homeowners Policy Special Form
3, p. 6, Form # FP-7173 (1/83).
[Vol. 31
1990] EARTH MOVEMENT CLAIMS IN CALIFORNIA 39
b. Earth Movement, whether combined with water or
not, including but not limited to earthquake, volcanic
eruption, landslide, subsidence, mudflow, sinkhole ero-
sion, or the sinking, rising, shifting, expanding, or con-
tracting of earth."
Finally, the provisions described above were reinforced
to assure that coverage would be denied if earth movement
combined with defective design or defective construction to
cause a loss. This was done through a clause that provided:
We do not insure for loss consisting of one or more of
the items below. Further, we do not insure for loss de-
scribed . . . immediately above regardless of whether one
or more of the following: a) directly or indirectly cause,
contribute to or aggravate the loss; or b) occur before, at
the same time, or after the loss or any other cause of
the loss: a. conduct, act, failure to act, or decision of any
person, group, organization or governmental body wheth-
er intentional, wrongful, negligent, or without fault; b.
defect, weakness, inadequacy, fault or unsoundness in: (1)
planning, zoning, development, surveying, siting; (2) de-
sign, specifications, workmanship, construction, grading,
compaction; (3) materials used in construction or repair;
or (4) maintenance; of any property (including land,
structures, or improvements of any kind) whether on or
off the residence premises. However, we do insure for
ensuing loss from items a. and b. unless the ensuing loss
is itself a Loss Not Insured by this Section.4 5
The expectation of the companies that adopted the new
language was that changes in the policy form would "extri-
cate the property insurance industry from the most signif-
icant and perplexing problems it has faced in decades."46
Certainly the elimination of the phrase "all risk" from the
basic insurance clause should go a long way in reducing the
expectations of policy holders. It was common practice of
insurance agents and brokers to recommend the purchase of
44. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. Homeowers Policy Special Form 3, p. 8,
Form # FP-7173 (1/83).
45. Id. at 9. The changes in the policy form also changed the scope of cover-
age with regard to other causes of loss, but the discussion here will be confined
to the effect of policy changes on earth movement claims. For a discussion of the
other changes, see Bragg, supra note 4.
46. Bragg, supra note 4, at 399.
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"all risk" coverage without providing a detailed explanation
of what that phrase meant. Seldom would a salesperson go
through the many exclusions and exceptions contained in the
"all risk" policy. No doubt many consumers took the term
"all risk" literally.
III. MODERN ALL RISK POLICIES PROVIDE LESS COVERAGE
These changes in policy forms will significantly reduce
the scope of coverage as compared to former "all risk"
building insurance policies. Moreover those companies that
did not adopt the new policy language are likely to benefit
from the passage of Section 10088 of the California Insur-
ance Code.47 This statute provides:
[N]o policy which by its terms does not cover the peril
of earthquake shall provide or shall be held to provide
coverage for any loss or damage when earthquake is a
proximate cause regardless of whether the loss or dam-
age also directly or indirectly results from or is contrib-
uted to, concurrently or in any sequence by any other
proximate or remote cause, whether or not covered by
the policy . . . 4
Furthermore, the majority opinion in the case of Garvey v.
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company49 seems to require
fact-finders to choose which cause was "the efficient proxi-
mate cause" when an excluded cause and a covered cause
combine to cause a resulting loss to insured property.5"
Courts will no longer be, able to do as the trial court did in
Garvey and hold for the insured by finding that a covered
cause was at least one cause of the loss. If there are two
causes, and one is covered and the other excluded, the find-
er of fact must determine which of the two was the efficient
proximate cause.
The changes in policy language, the new statute, and the
Garvey holding are certain to cause a reduction in the num-
ber of earth movement claims that will be covered under
building insurance policies. However, before concluding that
a potential earth movement claim is not covered, some ame-
47. See supra note 8.
48. CAL. INS. CODE § 10088 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990).
49. 48 Cal. 3d 395, 770 P.2d 704, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1089).
50. Id. at 409, 770 P.2d at 712, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 302-03.
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liorating factors must be considered.
Because many companies did not inform their customers
that the scope of coverage was reduced, those customers may
be able to rely on their previous policy forms. If an insured
has remained with the same company since before 1983, the
insured might be able to estop the insurer from relying on
the new policy. language. The pre-1983 policies provided
broader coverage because they did not exclude losses caused
by earth movement combined with defective design or defec-
tive construction.
Moreover, Section 10088 of the Insurance Code applies
only to earthquakes and therefore does not apply to many
other forms of earth movement losses which were covered
before the change in policy forms. Customers who can rely
on the old policy forms may be able to recover when defec-
tive design has combined with earth movement to cause a
loss. Moreover, Section 10088 may be unconstitutional when
applied to contractual rights that arose prior to the passage
of the statute.5 '
51. On its face the statute restricts the court's ability to apply the doctrine of
concurrent causation to policies that exclude loss caused in part by earthquake.
However, it is not clear how this statute will be applied to policy obligations that
arose prior to the statute's enactment in 1984. If the insured relies on policy
rights that arose prior to the enactment of the statute, tile courts may choose not
to apply the statute. Such a situation could arise in connection with policyholders
who were not adequately informed of the reduction in coverage in policies issued
subsequent to 1983. Those policyholders should be able to rely on the scope of
coverage provided under their earlier policies.
Even if the California courts should choose to apply the statute to policy
rights that accrued prior to the enactment of the statute, such application might
violate Article I, section 10 of the Constitution of the United States which spe-
cifically prohibits a state legislature from impairing the obligation of contracts.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1: "No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex
post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . ." See J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, AND J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 411 n.1, 412 n.3,
461-71 (2d ed. 1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 615-28 (2d ed.
1988).
For example, in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234
(1978), the Supreme Court held that a Minnesota law violated the Contract Clause
of the Constitution because it increased the monetary obligations of companies
with pre-existing pension plans if the company either terminated the plan or
closed their business facility in Minnesota. The court recognized the general
principle that states can enact legislation which limits contractual rights provided
the state uses reasonable and narrow means to protect a basic societal interest. Id.
at 242. The majority found the Minnesota law clearly violated the contract clause
because the law was a substantial impairment of contract rights. Id. at 245. The
plaintiff company had reasonably relied on prior rights only to incur unexpected
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The California Supreme Court's Garvey opinion substan-
tialy reduces the likelihood of recovery on any insurance
claim involving concurrent causation by requiring the finder
of fact to choose which cause was the single efficient proxi-
mate cause. However, when there are two possible causes,
the insurer still has the burden of proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the excluded cause was the efficient
proximate cause. In addition, the logic of the majority opin-
ion in Garvey is so inherently flawed, it seems possible that
the court might be persuaded to reconsider its position.52
additional obligations as a result of die law, id. at 247, and the law did not
remedy an important and general social problem because it focused on a narrow
group of employers. Id. at 248.
The factors articulated in the Allied opinion support an insured plaintiff
who relies on insurance policy rights that arose prior to the enactment of Section
10088, and that now provide reduced coverage as a result of the enactment of
Section 10088. The basic societal interest that Section 10088 benefits is not readily
apparent, and in fact the statute appears to benefit solely the insurance industry.
The dissent in Allied argued that the contract clause can be read only to reach
legislative acts that impair or abrogate existing contractual rights, and may not be
used to reach laws which merely increase existing contractual obligations. Id. at
251. This argument also supports an insured who argues that Section 10088 im-
pairs their existing contactual rights under a previous policy.
The Allied decision appears to be tied closely to its facts and is limited by
the qualifying factors die court used in holding the law unconstitutional. However,
the opinion represents an enlargement of the scope of the contract clause as it
had been used by the court in recent years. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, AND J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 470 (2d ed. 1983).
52. A detailed criticism of the Gaivey opinion is beyond the scope of this
article. However, anyone familiar with basic principles of insurance should be able
to show that the majority of the court was misled by biased insurance industry
"scholarship" that will not withstand close scrutiny. The basic premise in Garvey is
that first party coverage must be distinguished from third party coverage in cases
involving concurrent causation. There is no sound reason for making this distinc-
tion and leading authorities in insurance law have rejected such reasoning. See,
e.g., R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, INSURANcE LAW § 5.5(d) (1988) (comparing tort and
contract law on the issue of proximate cause). The vast majority of courts that
have considered concurrent causation in recent years have refused to apply such a
distinction. See, e.g., cases cited supi notes 16-17.
When a loss is caused by two or more actual causes, asking the finder of
fact to determine which of them was the "efficient proximate cause" is like asking
the fact finder to decide whether the chicken came before the egg, or visa versa.
Surely there will be many instances where a loss is caused by two causes where
neither of them, acting alone, would have caused a loss. For example the pressure
of underground water may cause a loss to a retaining wall that is improperly
designed, where it would be no problem with regard to a properly designed wall.
If the policy excludes loss caused by pressure of underground water, but does not
exclude loss caused by defective design, it is difficult to understand why a jury
should be forced to choose which was the efficient proximate cause when neither
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IV. PRINCIPLES OF RENEWAL OF INSURANCE POLICIES
It is a generally accepted principal of insurance law that
when an insurance policy renewal is made, the terms of the
original policy become a part of the renewal contract of
insurance unless notice of any changes is provided and called
to the attention of the insured." The insured has a right to
expect that the new protection will be essentially similar to
that afforded by the former contract. 54 Upon renewal of a
policy, the insurer is required to provide adequate notice of
any change in terms, and if it does not, such change does
not become part of the contract.5 5 Merely instructing the in-
sured to carefully read the new contract has been found
insufficient to notify the insured of any changes in cover-
age,56 and this should be particularly true when the scope
of coverage has been substantially reduced under the new
policy. In attempting to reach a synthesis of cases from Cali-
fornia and New Jersey, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
adopted the following rule:
[Wjhen an insurer by renewal of a policy or by an en-
dorsement to an existing policy substantially reduces the
prior insurance coverage provided the insured, the insur-
er has an affirmative duty to notify the insured in writing
of the change in coverage. Failure to do so shall render
the purported reduction in coverage void. Any question
of an individual's insurance coverage shall then be deter-
mined in accordance with the terms of the original poli-
cy prior to the renewal or endorsement. 57
It is likely that many companies switched to the new
policy forms and reduced the scope of coverage without ade-
quately informing the insured that there had been such a
reduction. In such cases the insured should be able to rely
cause, acting alone, would have resulted in a loss.
53. JOHN APPELMAN AND JEAN APPELMAN, 13A INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 7648 (1976) [hereinafter APPELMAN].
54. 18 G. COUCH, CoucH ENCYCLOPEDIA ON INSURANCE LAW § 68:61 (2d ed.
1983) [hereinafter COUCH].
55. APPLEMAN, supra note 53, at § 7648.
56. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. United States, 400 F.2d 172 (10th Cir.
1968) (dictum).
57. Canadian Universal Ins. Co. v. Fire Watch, 258 N.W.2d 570, 575 (Minn.
1977). But cf., Mundy v. Lumberman's Mut. Gas. Co., 783 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1986).
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on the coverage provided by their original policy terms. For
example, one leading company sent a notice with its new
policy forms indicating that the policy had been
"changed ... to underscore" that there were certain types of
loss which are not covered. The notice indicated that "under
no circumstances does this policy form insure for loss involv-
ing ... earthquake ... or various other forms of earth
movement.58 Even if we were to assume that the insured
had read and understood every word of the previous policy,
the renewal notice does not give any indication that there
has been a reduction in coverage. A policyholder who re-
membered the terms of the previous policy would have un-
derstood that under no circumstances did the policy cover
loss caused solely by earth movement. Moreover, most
insureds would naturally presume earth movement to include
earthquake. Nevertheless, the old policy form would have
covered losses caused by a combination of earth movement
and defective design. The new policy form substantially re-
duced the coverage being provided to the insured.
Counsel for the insurance company was capable of de-
scribing this reduction in coverage in fairly simple language
for the benefit of his fellow defense counsel. 9 However, the
58. The full text of the notice sent to insureds read as follows:
This is your new State Farm Homeowners policy form. Please place
your current endorsements with your new policy form. We encourage
you to read it and especially direct your attention to the new provi-
sions of SECTION 1 - LOSS INSURED and SECTION 1 - LOSS
NOT INSURED. We have changed your policy form to underscore
that there are certain types of loss which are not covered. Your State
Farm Homeowners policy form is one of the broadest policy forms
available. We want you to understand, however, that every policy form
contains limitations and exclusions. For instance, under no circum-
stances does this policy form insure for loss involving nuclear incident
(except direct loss by fire), flood, earthquake (except by specific en-
dorsement), or various other forms of earth movement or water dam-
age. Similarly, certain home maintenance is not covered. Please care-
fully read SECTION 1 - LOSS NOT INSURED to acquaint yourself
with other types of loss which are not covered. We want you to be
fully informed about your coverages as well as exclusions to and limi-
tations of those coverages. If you have any questions bout these
coverages, exclusions, or limitations, we urge that you contact your
State Farm agent. Some of the Homeowner policy deductible options
have been eliminated. Please notice the deductibles applicable to your
policy on the Extension Certificate.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. Homeowners Policy Special Form # FP-7173 (1/83)R.
59. In an article published two years after issuance of the new policy forms,
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company was apparently unwilling to share this explanation
with its policy holders; perhaps fearing that a clear explana-
tion would put the company at a competitive disadvantage.
The policy holder is told that the new policy "is one of the
broadest policy forms available," but is not informed that it
is not as broad as the old form. This means that the insured
is deprived of an opportunity to shop for a policy similar to
his previous one that would not exclude loss due to defective
design or construction. When an insurance company sends
its customers a new policy form without explaining that the
new policy does not provide them with as much protection
as the old policy form, the wrong done is similar to the
butcher who puts his thumb on the scale to make the cus-
tomer think he is getting more meat than he is paying for.
The remedy provided by the courts is to allow the insured to
have his coverage determined in accordance with the terms
of the original policy.
Before conceding that an earth movement claim is not
covered under a policy, the insured and counsel should
check to see what kind of notice of reduction in coverage
was provided when the current policy form was issued. If the
notice of reduction in coverage was inadequate, the insured
should be able to rely on coverage the old policy. If an agent
or broker switched the insured's coverage to a new company
without informing the insured that the coverage had been re-
duced, it is possible that the agent or broker might be re-
sponsible for a loss that would have been covered under the
old policy form. However, there are no cases deciding this
issue.
V. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court has certainly made it
more difficult for a plaintiff to make a concurrent causation
claim against his insurer, but it has not yet made success
impossible. Changes in policy language have also added to
the difficulty. However, it seems likely that many
policyholders will be able to rely on the language of their old
Michael E. Bragg, assistant counsel of State Farm Insurance Companies explained
the coverage reduction with two hypothetical cases worthy of a Restatement
reporter. See Bragg, supra note 4, at 393.
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policy if they have stayed with the same company since the
language changes took place.
Litigation of any damage claim against an insurer is an
arduous task. Proper preparation and consultation with attor-
neys who have had both experience and success in litigating
claims involving structural damage should allow many
plaintiff's to prevail even under the standards set by Garvey.
